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On Precarious Ground: Binding
Arbitration Clauses, Collective
Bargaining Agreements, and Waiver
of Statutory Workplace
Discrimination Claims Post-Pyett
Duraku v. Tishman Speyer Properties, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1960s, federal and state governments put into place a maze of sta-
tutes aimed at protecting the civil rights of minorities, both in society and in the
workplace.2 While these statutes have undoubtedly lessened workplace discrimi-
nation for minorities in the United States, there are still some areas that are uncer-
tain or unsettled, especially when a union is involved on behalf of the employees.
More to the point, there has been a wealth of confusion as to whether the right to
bring a statutory workplace discrimination claim can be waived when a worker
joins a union and allows the union to bargain on their behalf. Most recently, in 14
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,3 the U.S. Supreme Court took note of this uncertainty.
However, in an attempt to resolve the turmoil, the Court left conflicting, yet
controlling, precedents to be solved in future terms. Additionally, some of the
conclusions reached in Pyett have left the original nature of statutory workplace
discrimination claims on uncertain terrain. The U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York's decision in Duraku v. Tishman Speyer Properties, Inc.
reflects this turmoil. In Duraku, employees who alleged statutory workplace dis-
crimination claims were compelled to follow an ex post supplement to their col-
lective bargaining agreement despite the union's refusal to pursue the grievance.4
In reaching its decision, the court made a harsh determination, reflecting over
thirty-five years of ambiguous case law on the subject. The Duraku decision
gives unions and employers another foothold to continue the consolidation of
control over all matters even tangentially related to employment, a control that
they have enjoyed for more than 15 years. Worse yet, it puts our justice system on
a course where unionized employees will have no judicial forum to grieve statuto-
1. 714 F. Supp. 2d 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
2. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000(c)-2000(c)(1 5) (2006)); see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-34 (1967) Pub. L. No. 88-352 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(c)-
2000(c)(15) (2006)). etc.
3. 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1463 (2009) (discussing the tension between the Supreme Court's decisions in
Alexander v. Gardncr-Denver, Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991)).
4. Duraku, 714 F. Supp, 2d at 471-72.
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ry claims and will instead be forced to rely on unions to arbitrate or decide any
and all claims on their behalf.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiffs Sonya Duraku, Nieves Sanchez, and Julia Inirio were employed as
cleaners at a New York City commercial office building manage by Tishman
Speyer Properties. The three plaintiffs were members of Service Employees
International Union, Local 32BJ (Union). During their employment, the Union
had a binding collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Realty Advisory
Board on Labor Relations (RAB), a group to which Tishman Speyer was a mem-
ber.7 Thus, the plaintiffs were bound to the agreement that governed their em-
ployment as well as all grievance procedures.! The agreement included a non-
discrimination clause? and provided that arbitration was the "sole and exclusive
method" of grievance resolution in all matters, including violations of the non-
discrimination policy and other statutory claims.' 0
During their employment, the three plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected
to harassment and retaliation from their supervisors. " The plaintiffs originally
brought the matter to the attention of the Union, but it refused to arbitrate their
claims.' 2  Following this refusal, plaintiffs sought and received from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) a "Notice of Right to Sue".' 3
Following receipt of the notice, plaintiffs filed a complaint in October 2009
against Tishman Speyer under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,14 the New





There shall be no discrimination against any present or future employee by reason of race, creed,
color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union membership, sexual orientation, or any characte-
ristic protected by law, including, but not limited to, claims made pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Code, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, the Family and Medical Leave Act, or any other similar laws, rules or regulations. All
such claims shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures (Articles VII and VIII) as
the sole and exclusive remedy for violations. Arbitrators shall apply appropriate law in rendering
decisions based upon claims of discrimination.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss Plaintiffs
Complaint at 6-7, Duraku v. Tishman Speyer Props., Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 470 (2010) (No.
109CV09351).
10. Id.; Duraku, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
I1. Duraku, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
12. Id.
13. Id. The EEOC has broad statutory authority to enforce most claims of employment or workplace
discrimination. See, e.g., §§ 2000(c)(2), (e)(3), (c)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c)(5) (2006). Under this
authority, the EEOC requires that any individual that plans to bring a claim for relief for workplace
discrimination must first file a complaint with the EEOC. Following receipt of the complaint and
investigation of the grievance, the EEOC will either dismiss the complaint or grant the claimant a
"Notice of Right to Sue", which allows the claimant to bring a cause of action in federal district courts
on the claims granted by the EEOC. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (2009). The process is more fully explained
on the EEOC's website. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Filing a Lawsuit,
http://www.ccoc.gov/cmployeeslawsuit.cfn (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c) (2006).
226 [Vol. 2011
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York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL),s and the New York City Human
Rights Code (NYCHRC).' 6 In response, Tishman Speyer filed a motion to dis-
miss the complaint and compel arbitration. 7 After plaintiffs filed an opposition,
Tishman Speyer replied, indicating for the first time that a supplemental agree-
ment had been made between the Union and the RAB in February 2010 (The Feb-
ruary 2010 Agreement).' 8 The February 2010 Agreement between the Union and
the RAB acknowledged that, following the Pyett decision, there was a dispute as
to whether the original CBA allowed employees to bring post-union-refusal
claims in court. 9 They also stipulated in the February 2010 Agreement that the
protocols listed therein were, in essence, a temporary "pilot program on discrimi-
nation claims" established in hopes of finding a middle ground acceptable for all
parties.20 The February 2010 Agreement established a protocol for non-binding
mediation followed by binding arbitration in discrimination cases. 21 The February
2010 Agreement further stipulated that in cases where mediation was unsuccessful
and the Union declined to pursue the claim, members of the Union were bound to
arbitrate with the RAB. 22
In Duraku, the issue before the court was whether the February 2010 Agree-
ment, made after the time of the incident in the claim and after the claims were
brought, was binding on the plaintiffs in terms of resolving an individual statutory
grievance. The plaintiffs argued that, despite the language of the original CBA,
they were not bound to arbitrate by the February 2010 Agreement.23 Tishman
Speyer argued that the February 2010 Agreement compelled all members of the
Union to arbitrate, despite what time the alleged grievance may have occurred.24
The instant court agreed with Tishman Speyer's assertion, and held that the Feb-
ruary 2010 Agreement between the Union and the RAB compelled all members of
the Union to arbitrate, despite the fact that the agreement went into effect after the
filing of the plaintiffs' complaint.25 However, rather than fully granting Tishman
Speyer's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration, the court ordered a stay pend-
15. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290 (McKinney 2004).
16. Duraku, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 472 (citing N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502 (2009)).
17. Duraku, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
18. Id.
19. See Declaration of Michael Badowski in Support rc: MOTION to Compel Arbitration.
MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint, Duraku v. Tishman Spcyer Props., Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d
470 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2010) (No. 109CV09351); see also Exhibit #1 (Attached), Agreement and
Protocol, Signed Feb. 17, 2010.
20. Id. The Union contended that the CBA "do[es] not make provision for arbitration of any claims
that the Union does not choose to take to arbitration, including statutory discrimination claims, and
therefore, individual employees are not barred from pursuing their claims in court where the Union has
declined to pursue them in arbitration," The RAB contended otherwise. See Exhibit #1 at *1. Both
parties agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration in June of 2009, but decided to hold that arbitration
in abeyance for a period of time (no less than 90 days) while they determined whether the pilot pro-
gram was successful in resolving the dispute. Id.
21. Duraku, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
22. Id. at 473.
23. Id. at 474.
24. Id. at 472-73.
25. Id. at 473.
No. 1] 227
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ing the compelled arbitration. 26 The court reasoned that a stay was proper because
it would allow the case to move more quickly through the arbitration process.27
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The instant court relied primarily upon a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,2 8 in making its decision. However, the issue
of compelled arbitration for statutory claims of discrimination can essentially be
laid out in three eras: the era of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,29 where the
Supreme Court was clear in stating that statutory claims could not be waived and
submitted solely to arbitration; the era of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,30 which saw a slight but significant reversal of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Gardner-Denver, and the current post-Pyett era. The Pyett court in partic-
ular seems to have completely overturned all case law related to Gardner-Denver,
leaving a bleak future for those who wish to bring such statutory claims in a non-
arbitral forum.
A. The Origin of Compelled Arbitration In Cases of Statutory Discrimina-
tion Claims-Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
In 1974, the Supreme Court had its first chance to rule on arbitration proceed-
ings in the context of statutory claims made under Title VII of the relatively new
Civil Rights Act of 1964.31 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., a manufacturing
company terminated the three-year employment of an African-American em-
ployee, alleging that the employee had a high rate of producing defective or unus-
able parts.32 Following discharge by the company, the employee filed a grievance
with his union against the employer for wrongful termination.3 3 The filed griev-
ance contained no claim of racial discrimination.34 After his claims were rejected,
the grievance was sent to arbitration, per the collective bargaining agreement.35
Prior to the hearing, the employee filed a racial discrimination complaint with the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, who forwarded the complaint to the EEOC.
Following a ruling by the arbitrator that the termination was for cause, and a dis-
trict court and appellate level finding of the same, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
26. Id. at 475.
27. Duraku, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
28. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
29. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
30. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
31. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000(c)-(e)(15) (2006)).
32. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 38.
33. Id. at 39.
34. Id.
35. Id. While the company retained the right to make any employment decision regarding hiring or
termination for "proper cause," the agreoment also contained explicit non-discrimination provisions,
and a broad arbitration clause covering all provisions in the agreement and requiring compulsory
arbitration for all grievances arising out of terms of employment, including for statutory discrimination
claims. Id.
36. Id. at 42.
[Vol. 2011228
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certiorari. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that a prior submission of a
claim to final arbitration did not extinguish a statutory right to a trial de novo.
The Court came to that holding based on several conclusions. First, the Court
held that Title Vil was intended to be a supplement and not a replacement for
existing laws and institutions.39 Second, the Court found that mere submission of
a claim to arbitration does not waive a cause of action under Title VII, as the
rights conferred cannot be Zrospectively waived and can form no part of the col-
lective-bargaining process. Further, the Court determined that an arbitrator can
only rule on issues and questions of contractual rights, even if those rights resem-
ble or duplicate Title VII rights.4 ' The Court also ruled that a Title VII action is
not a review of an arbitrator's decision but instead, an assertion of a statutory right
independent of the arbitration process. 42 Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the Court found that Congress clearly intended Title VII to hold federal courts
finally responsible for enforcement, and deferral by courts to an arbitrator's deci-
sion would lead to incomplete fact-finding, emphasizing the "law of the shop"
rather than the "law of the land".43
B. Confusion on the Issue-Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
Case law for the next seventeen years proceeded under the context laid out in
Gardner-Denver. Several subsequent cases, most notably Barrentine v. Arkansas-
Best Freight System, Inc.M and McDonald v. West Branch,45 ruled along the lines
that statutory claims-discriminatory or other-were independent of the collec-
tive-bargaining process. Thus, courts determined that such claims could be
brought in federal court and were not bound by arbitration, even under collective-
bargaining agreements mandating arbitration and even in cases where the claims
37. Id. at 42-43.
38. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 59-60.
39. Id. at 48-49.
Moreover, the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an indi-
vidual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and fed-
eral statutes. The clear inference is that Title VIl was designed to supplement, rather than sup-
plant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination.
Id.
40. Id. at 51-52.
[W]c think it clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title
VII. It is true, of course, that a union may waive certain statutory rights related to collective ac-
tivity, such as the right to strike. ... Title Vil, on the other hand, stands on plainly different
ground; it concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employment op-
portunities ... . [T]he [Title ViH] rights conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining
process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind
Title VII. In these circumstances, an employee's rights under Title VII are not susceptible of
prospective waiver.
Id.
41. Id. at 53-54.
42. Id. at 54.
43. Id. at 57-59.
44. 450 U.S. 728 (1981) ( involving workers asserting a minimum-wage claim under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 102-219 (1988).
45. 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (involving a discharged police officer asserting a wrongful termination and
civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
No. I] 229
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had been submitted to an arbitral forum." In this context, the Supreme Court had
seemingly resolved most issues regarding the nature of statutory claims under
collective-bargaining agreements, at least with regard to Title VII.
However, 1991 saw the Supreme Court revisit the issue in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp.47 In Gilmer, an employee brought a wrongful termina-
tion statutory claim against his employer under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967 (ADEA).48 By requirement of the employer, the plaintiff in
Gilmer was required to register with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 49
Among other items in the NYSE's registration application was a rule requiring
arbitration in any instance where a grievance was brought by a NYSE-registered
representative against an employer for any issues related to "employment or ter-
mination" of the representative.50 Based on the arbitration clause in the applica-
tion and on the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the employer moved to compel
arbitration. The employer's motion was based on the precedent set forth in Gard-
ner-Denver.5' The Gilmer Court, however, held that a claim brought under the
ADEA could indeed be subject to compulsory arbitration.5 2 The Court noticed the
possible conflict and was quick to distinguish Gilmer from Gardner-Denver. The
Court noted that Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and McDonald were all predicated
on whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded a later resolution of
statutory claims in a judicial forum. In Gilmer, the Court noted that those cases
contained no agreements by the employees or the union to arbitrate statutory
claims and thus, did not bar subsequent judicial actions on statutory claims. The
Court in Gilmer also noted that union representatives, rather than an individual
attorney, would have represented the employee in Gardner-Denver.55 Because the
arbitration clause in Gilmer did not bind a union and its members to arbitration,
but rather an individual and the employer, the employee in Gilmer would have
procured his own representation, thus affording him more control and representa-
tion over the proceedings.
On a final note, the Gilmer court took into account (although not explicitly
stating so) that, unlike Title VII, there was no observable Congressional intent to
preclude arbitration of claims under the ADEA.57 As such, the Court ruled in
favor of allowing compelled arbitration to serve as a complete and total substitute
for judicial proceedings on statutory claims arising under the ADEA. In ruling as
it did, the Court also gave rise to a new level of uncertainty for allowing com-
pelled arbitration to serve as a substitute for judicial proceedings on statutory
claims of discrimination in general.
46. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290-91; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745-46.
47. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
48. Id. at 23-24; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1967).
49. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 24.
52. Id. at 26-27.
53. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34-35.
54. Id.
55. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
56. Id. (Stcvcns, J. dissenting).
57. Id. at 29, 33-34.
[Vol. 2011230
6
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2011, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2011/iss1/13
On Precarious Ground
C. Conflicting Yet Controlling Precedent-14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett
With the terrain unstable, the Court handled several cases involving statutory
claims in a collective-bargaining environment but deigned to rule on the issue of
whether such claims were arbitrable under either the Gilmer standard or the FAA.
Most notable of the post-Gilmer line of cases is Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp.5 The Wright Court noted the tension between the Gardner-Denver
and Gilmer line of cases, and yet, it failed to resolve that tension.59
In 2009, the Supreme Court revisited the issue yet again with the decision in
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett. In Pyett,6 several employees of Temco Service
Industries (Temco), a maintenance service, were normally assigned to a building
owned and operated by 14 Penn Plaza, LLC (Penn Plaza), in the capacity of night
lobby watchmen.6i Following a Union-approved contract between Penn Plaza and
a private security firm to fill those capacities, Temco reassigned the employees to
other areas in the same building.62 The employees filed grievances with the Union
alleging that the reassignments were based on age discrimination and led to loss in
income and emotional distress.63
After the Union's filing of the grievances and failure to obtain relief on any
claims, the Union requested arbitration under its collective-bargaining agree-
ment.6 Following the initial arbitration hearing, the Union withdrew the claims
related to age discrimination, reasoning that the Union's approval of the contract
between Penn Plaza and the private security firm meant that there could be no
legitimate objections by the Union to the reassignment.65 The employees then
filed a complaint with the EEOC, which dismissed their complaint for failure to
find a violation of the ADEA based on the evidence but notified them of their
right to sue. The employees then filed a complaint in district court, to which
Temco and Penn Plaza filed motions compelling arbitration.67 The motions by
Temco and Penn Plaza were denied by both the district court and the Second Cir-
cuit appellate court, holding that Gardner-Denver's decision that a collective-
bargaining agreement could not waive statutory rights remained good law." The
Second Circuit, in particular, noted the tension between Gardner-Denver and
Gilmer.69 The Second Circuit reconciled this tension by holding that an individual
could waive statutory claims and choose compulsory arbitration, but that a union
could not collectively bargain for arbitration on behalf of its members for those
claims.o
58, 525 U.S. 70 (1998) (alleging discrimination in violation of American with Disabilities Act
(ADA) for refusal ro rehire longshoreman, injured on the job).
59. Id. at 76-77.
60. See generally 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (addressing a controversy
between the same local Union and RAB that are present in this case).
61. Id. at 1458.
62. Id. at 1461-62.
63. Id. at 1462.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1462.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1462-63.
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The Pyett Court, however, reversed the decisions of the lower courts, holding
that a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires
union members to arbitrate ADEA and other statutory claims is enforceable and
binding as a matter of federal law.7' The Court came to this conclusion by first
looking at the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which mandates that repre-
sentatives selected for collective bargaining shall have the ability to bargain for all
"conditions of employment," provided that there are proper grievance procedures
in place. The Court then looked at past precedent regarding the bargaining
process between a union and an employer, reasoning that the normal flow of such
negotiations may include tradeoffs in the CBA such as what statutory and contrac-
tual rights are covered. The Court also examined past holdings, which held that
courts "generally may not interfere in this bargained-for exchange."74 Thus, the
Court determined that the language of a statute that outlines a particular grievance
(or class of grievances) must also preclude that grievance(s) from being resolved
under the NLRA in order for courts to ignore a collective-bargaining agreement
that compels arbitration for the grievance(s).75  The Court also distinguished
Gardner-Denver by establishing that the arbitration clause at issue in Gardner-
Denver did not cover both statutory and contractual claims in explicitly "clear and
unmistakable language."76
However, one particular facet of Pyett still leaves uncertainty for future cases
involving statutory claims. The employees in Pyett failed to bring up two argu-
ments in the lower courts, which were later advanced in front of the Supreme
Court. First, they argued that the collective-bargaining agreement did not "clearly
and unmistakably require them to arbitrate their ADEA claims."77 Second, they
claimed that although a substantive waiver of federally-protected civil rights is
never to be upheld, the collective-bargaining agreement allowed the Union to
prevent them from vindicating their federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.
As such, the Supreme Court pronounced that they had forfeited those arguments.
The Court stated that ruling on those arguments would not be proper because it
would require the Court to come to conclusions of fact rather than law. 9 Further,
the Pyett opinion restated that the Court's general principle is to be hesitant to
invalidate arbitration agreements based on speculation.80
Although the Pyett court took several steps to try and clarify the law with re-
gard to compelled arbitration on statutory claims, there are still several questions
left unaddressed-which is reflected in the instant decision.
71. Id. at 1474.
72. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1460, 1466 (2009); see also 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006).
73. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1464.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1465.
76. Id. at 1468-69.
77. Id. at 1473-74.
78. Id. at 1474.
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Duraku, the court for the Southern District of New York began by looking
at the substantive federal policy surrounding arbitration, noting that federal policy,
as embodied in the FAA, strongly favors arbitration as an alternative means of
dispute resolution." The court also noted that the purpose of the FAA is to ensure
that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to the terms of the
agreement and implied that courts should not interfere with such agreements.
The court then proceeded to analyze using a four part test, whether it had
power to determine if the parties involved had agreed to arbitrate the issue.8 3
First, the court examined whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate.84
Second, the court found that if such an agreement existed, they were to determine
to what extent that agreement existed between the parties.85 Third, the court
looked at whether any federal statutory claims (if asserted) were non-arbitrable
under the intent of Congress. Finally, the court had to determine whether to stay
the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration if some but not all claims of the
case were arbitrable.
The court began its rationale by looking to Pyett's holding that a collective-
bargaining agreement which "clearly and unmistakably requires" arbitration for
statutory employment discrimination claims was enforceable under federal law.88
They also looked to Pyett's ruling that such requirements remained enforceable
unless the statute itself precluded a waiver of judicial remedies for the rights at
issue.89 The court then applied that holding and found, in the instant case, that the
CBA and supplementary agreement expressly required resolution of statutory
employment discrimination claims through mediation and arbitration.90 The court
further found that Congress did not intend to make the statutory discrimination
and retaliation claims non-arbitrable.9 '
Having determined that Congress did not intend to preclude a waiver of judi-
cial remedies for statutory employment discrimination claims, the court proceeded
to the issue of the Agreement.92 More specifically, the court looked to the express
language of the Agreement, which stated, "[w]henever it is claimed that an em-
ployer has violated the no discrimination clause (including claims based in statute)
of one of the CBAs, . . . the matter shall be submitted to mediation."93 Using
81. Duraku v. Tishman Speyer Props., Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 470, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Ra-
gone v. Atlanta Video, 595 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2010)).
82. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2; Stolt-Niclson, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773
(2010)).





87. Id. (citing Pyelt, 129 S. Ct. at 1465).
88. Duraku, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
89. Id. (citing Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1465).
90. Id. at 474.
91. Id. (citing Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1999), and
Rodriguez v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 2009 WL 2001328, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 1999)).
92. Duraku, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
93. Id. (emphasis in original)
No. I] 233
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literal interpretation, the court read the term "whenever" to apply to all points
covered by the original CBA. 4 It then took the protocols set forth in the Agree-
ment, which included a mandated right for individual employees to arbitrate all
claims against the employer-including statutory discrimination claims.95 Thus,
the instant court held that the scope of the Agreement explicitly addressed its ap-
plication to the claims in the instant case.96
Having proceeded through the four-part test and having determined that arbi-
tration was and should be compelled, the court had one decision to make: whether
to grant Tishman Speyer's motion to dismiss the court proceedings, or alternative-
ly, to stay the proceedings until completion of arbitration.97 The court found that a
dismissal is reviewable by an appellate court under section 16(a)(3) of the FAA,
whereas a stay is an unappealable interlocutory order under section 16(b).98 The
court then applied what it determined to be a general policy of the Second Circuit
in cases dealing with compelled arbitration: that any determination to stay or dis-
miss a claim should be mindful of the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
and that courts should avoid unnecessary delays of the arbitral process through
appellate review.99 In accordance with the Second Circuit's general policy, the
instant court elected to stay the motion pending arbitration.'100
V. COMMENT
The Duraku opinion is a reflection of the unsteady terrain for statutory
workplace discrimination claims in the post-Pyett era. With possible implications
that could carry far beyond the jurisdiction of the Southern District of New York,
there are a few issues left by the instant decision that should give pause to those
concerned with the state of statutory civil rights in modern American law.
A. The Court Places An Unequal Reliance on Pyett
Perhaps the most visible issue in Duraku is the full weight that the court gives
to the Pyett decision, coupled with an almost complete departure from the Gard-
ner-Denver precedent. While a court may correctly give strong consideration to
the Pyett rationale, courts should also realize that Gardner-Denver still remains
good case law. It has accurately been observed that while there are seemingly
conflicting precedents made in Pyett, Pyett did not overrule Gardner-Denver's
94. Id.
Plaintiffs' arguments against arbitration are unavailing. The fact that the February 2010 Agree-
ment does not expressly state that it applies "retroactively" or to employees who, like plaintiffs,
have already elected to pursue their statutory rights in another forum does not relieve plaintiffs of
their obligation to abide by the mediation and arbitration protocol.
Id.
95. Duraku, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 474. The court stated, "[A]rbitration is mandated under the protocol
when "the Union has declined to take an individual employee's employment discrimination claim ...
and the employee is desirous of litigating the claim." Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 16(a)(3)-16(b) (2010).
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holdings, but merely narrowed them."o' The Pyett Court left standing many of the
key precepts in Gardner-Denver: that earlier arbitration of contractual issues does
not extinguish any civil claims brought after the arbitral hearings; etc. Yet, the
instant court relied upon the Pyett decision without giving any deference to Gard-
ner-Denver.
Despite the Pyett Court's rendering of the Gardner-Denver rule of barring
binding arbitration clauses on federal statutory claims to mere dicta, there are two
passages in Gardner-Denver that others have suggested would indicate that the
rule was a key holding and not dicta.'o2 First, Gardner-Denver stated that "there
can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII," 03 as they
are "individual" rights that "represent a congressional command that each em-
ployee be free from discriminatory practices" and allowing such a waiver as part
of a collective-bargaining a reement would "defeat the paramount congressional
purpose behind Title VII."' Second, the Gardner-Denver Court refused to adopt
the employer's suggested rule of deference to claims already in arbitration, citing
the unlikeliness that Congress intended a position of judicial deference to arbitral
forums on issues of Title VII statutory rights and giving a number of reasons why
Congress did and would find that a judicial forum would be more appropriate. 05
Thus, Pyett's rendering of much of Gardner-Denver as dicta has left two con-
flicting precedents in place. A standard rule that many federal circuits use for
determinations of cases where there are conflicting precedents is to recognize the
earliest case as binding.'1' Yet Duraku does not reflect this conflict, and instead
chooses to follow the latter decision as binding. In doing so, it leaves a precedent
for future Southern District judges approaching the same type of question-and
completely ignores what is still a very uncertain and unsettled area of arbitration-
related case law.
B. The "Retroactive" Agreement
While the Duraku court's departure from and failure to consider Gardner-
Denver remains most striking on the face of the opinion, perhaps the most egre-
gious aspect of the instant decision was the reliance upon a very tenuous Agree-
ment, and the court's omission of any mention of the temporary nature of the
Agreement. The only scintilla of a conflict of interpretation between the Union
and the RAB was addressed in a footnote-a footnote attached to a contention
101. Matthew Gierse, Note, All Bound Up With No Place To Go: A Lack of Individual Alternatives to
Binding Arbitration Provisions for Statutory Claims, 2010 J. DISP. REsOL. 189, 199-200 (2010) (ana-
lyzing Tewolde v. Owens & Minor Distrib., Inc., Civil No. 07-4075, 2009 WL 1653533 (Dist. Minn.
2009) (involving Title VII statutory claims made in the presence of a collective bargaining
agreement)).
102. E.E. Keenan, Collectively Bargained Employment Arbitration: 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 15
HARY. NEGOT. L. REV. 261, 273-74 (2010).
103. Id. at 273 (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51).
104. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51.
105. Keenan, supra note 104, at 274 (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-58).
106. See Folger Coffee Co. v. Int'l Union, 368 F. App'x 605, 606 (citing Rios v. City of Del Rio,
Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 425 n.8 (5th Circ.2006)) ("Where two previous holdings or lines of precedent
conflict the earlier opinion controls and is the binding precedent in this circuit."); see also POLICY OF
AVOIDING INTRA-CIRCUIT CONFLICT OF PRECEDENT, 3rd Cir. lOP 9.1 (2002)..
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from the plaintiffs that did not deal with the Agreement and which only mentioned
that matters of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement are matters
for the Union and the RAB to resolve. Absent that footnote, there is absolutely no
indication that the Agreement was transient in nature.
Yet the Duraku court uses a very dubious method of contractual interpretation
and reasoning to conclude that the Agreement was binding on the plaintiffs. First,
the court ignored the fact that the agreement was ex post complaint 07 Second,
the court ignored the fact that the Agreement was made during court proceedings
on the instant controversy. 08 Third, the court ignored that the Agreement was
made with no knowledge, input, or approval on the part of the plaintiffs.'*
Fourth, the court ignored the fact that the Agreement was made with the under-
standing and admission that both the Union and the RAB were still in dispute on
whether claims similar to the instant claim were allowable under the original
CBA. 0 It is clear from the published opinion that the entirety of the court's deci-
sion to compel the plaintiffs to arbitrate rests upon the Agreement."' If so, one
would certainly expect the tenuous and temporary structure of the Agreement to at
least be addressed in the dictum of the opinion, if not the actual background or
discussion portions.
The court's decision to apply the Agreement retroactively, during an ongoing
case, is of much concern to those concerned about the protection of statutory
rights in the workplace. The language of the Agreement was extremely vague in
terms of a timeline of applicability, with no explicitly outlined retroactivity clause.
Rather, the Agreement only stated, "Whenever it is claimed. . . .""' Without an
explicit retroactivity agreement, the term "whenever" could best be described as
either a term of art, or most likely a descriptor for events going forward from the
point of agreement. Even if one were to use the Pyett allowance of a waiver of
statutory rights, the instant court seemingly fails to recognize that the Agreement
does not contain a "clear . .. and unmistakabl[e]" waiver on behalf of the plain-
tiffs, insomuch as it is unclear whether the Agreement was meant to be retroac-
tively binding to the plaintiffs."'3 Rather, even the standard set forth by the instant
court would seem to indicate, from the vagaries of whether the plaintiffs fall under
the Agreement, that there is no real "clear and unmistakabl[e]" requirement that
binds the plaintiffs to arbitrate a grievance that is already being pursued in the
judicial system.
While it is often considered acceptable to come to supplementary collective
bargaining agreements that act retroactively in nature, it offends the concept of
justice to allow such agreements to be enacted and effective after a party has
properly elected to grieve their claim in the forum of their choosing. The rarity of
such cases is testament to that principle. To allow such an agreement to act re-





112. Duraku, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 474. (emphasis added).
113. Id at 743 ("A collectivc-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union
members to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims is enforceable as a matter of federal
law unless Congress precluded waiver ofjudicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.").
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troactively, when the retroactive nature itself is in question, and when it pertains
to such important rights, the argument can be made that no fundamental rights are
safe from such overly expansive agreements.
C Are Unionized Employees Truly Involved in a "Bargained-For
Exchange"?
A common precept of labor law is that an employee (or in this case, a union)
and an employer are participants in a "bargained-for exchange"-that is, that an
employee and an employer make certain concessions when negotiating the em-
ployment agreement or contract. The Duraku court, as well as past courts, made
mention of this bargained-for exchange in support of its decision. However, in a
modem era where one cannot be hired unless one maintains membership in the
union, that is a misleading argument. For example, during May 2010 in the New
York City-White Plains-Wayne metropolitan area, those employed in "service
occupations," as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statisticsll 4 accounted for rough-
ly 21.2 percent" 15 of a workforce of approximately 3,699,700 individuals-
roughly 784,336 service occupation workers total."' 6  Considering that the Union
in the instant case represents over 70,000 workers by their own account," 7 that
would mean roughly 9 percent of service-industry workers in New York City are
represented by one union alone. Considering that 24.2 percent of New York
State's workforce is unionized employees," 8 approximately 189,809 service oc-
cupation workers in New York City would be union employees. While there are
other options available, the numbers suggest that there is a much narrower range
of options available for employment with non-unionized workplaces.
Of course, correlation does not equal causation. But it does raise a question:
when so many workplaces are unionized, requiring mandatory membership and
compulsory assent to the collective bargaining agreement as a condition of em-
ployment, is it truly a "bargained-for exchange"? When one employee does not
even comprise one-one thousandth of the union's membership, should a union be
allowed to "bargain" away an individual employee's statutory rights in pursuit of
114. The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) groups the subclassifications of "healthcare
support occupations", "protective service occupations", "food preparation and service related occupa-
tions", "building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations", and "personal care and service
occupations" into the broad classification of"service occupations". See BLS, The 2010 SOC: A Classi-
fication System Gets An Update, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ooq/2010/summcr/art02.pdf at 17 (last
visited Nov. 07, 2010); see also BLS, 2010 Standard Occupational Classification Structure,
http://www.bls.gov/soc/socstructure 2010.pdf at 19-24 (last visited Nov. 07, 2010).
115. BLS, Occupational Employment and Wages in New York-White Plains-Wayne, May 2009,
http://www.bls.gov/ro2/oes9705.pdf. While "service occupations" is not specifically listed in this
document, the subclassifications under "service occupations" can be added to determine the approx-
imate percentage of the workforce who works in a "service occupation".
116. BLS, New York City Total Nonagricultural Payroll Employment--Current Employment Statis-
tics, http://www.bis.gov/ro2/nycces9465.pdf (last visited Nov. 08, 2010). While this number is not
verified, it can be estimated by taking the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics totals for number of people
employed in the New York-White Plains area, and applying the percentage of workers that the Bureau
claims are employed in "service occupations."
117. SEIU 32BJ, Home, (Nov. 08, 2010), http://www.sciu32bj.orgaulDistriet _NYM.asp.
118. BLS, Economic News Release-Union Members Summary, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
union2.nrO.htm (last visited Nov. 08, 2010).
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an agreement? Claims very similar to that of the instant case were at the heart of
Gardner-Denver, and it is hard to imagine that those who implemented Title VII
and those who ruled on Gardner-Denver finding that a compulsory surrendering
of statutory rights would be perfectly suitable under the law that they crafted.
VI. CONCLUSION
Some may posit that Duraku is merely but the most recent case in an evolu-
tion-or devolution, depending on one's point of view--of arbitration case law
over the last four decades. Some may (and have) argued that arbitration--once
considered "flimsy" by the legal community-has now evolved into a complex
and appropriate forum where two parties in controversy might be able to resolve
their differences in a less adversarial manner, thus allowing both parties to leave
the controversy behind, satisfied with the outcome. What those people might fail
to realize is that the continued, and increasingly uptempo, path of forcing individ-
ual employees to waive individual statutory, non-contractual rights to a collective
body as part of a condition of employment, puts a great number of citizens at risk.
Arbitration was intended to be a forum to resolve contractual disputes, but has
evolved-or devolved-into a non-mutual forum where individual rights are sa-
crificed and ignored to the collective, and where the power of the corporate dollar
can rule supreme due to unequal representation. This is a starkly dark and gloomy
cloud on the horizon, and should be disconcerting for those interested in maintain-




Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2011, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2011/iss1/13
